At a U.S. Air Force base in Arizona right now, Turkish Air Force pilots are learning how to fly American jets that
may never be delivered to Turkey - and a Russian missile could be to blame.
The Turkish government's decision to purchase the Russian-made S-400 surface-to-air missile system has
prompted serious backlash in the United States.
Beyond the current deep freeze in U.S.-Russian ties, some in the United States worry that
Turkey's operation of the American F-35 aircraft in range of the S-400's powerful radar - which is reportedly
capable of collecting electronic intelligence - will allow Russia to collect and exploit data about America and NATO's
future front line fighter.
As a result, the United States seems to be considering blocking the export of the F-35 to Turkey,
whose air force is set to receive the first two jets in late 2019 at an airbase in Malatya.
Denying the aircraft to Turkey would undoubtedly help protect its secrets from potential Russian compromise,
but would also signal to Turkey that it cannot be entrusted to safeguard Western defense equipment because
of its friendship with Russia.
Turkey has dismissed American concerns, telling the United States that it will not allow Russian
technicians to service the S-400 in Turkey, that it will design the missile's operating system to
prevent built-in Russian backdoors, and that the system will not be "plugged in" to NATO networks.
But according to my interviews with U.S. officials in the legislative and executive branches,
Ankara's reassurances have failed to assuage the concerns about sensitive information
on the F-35 ending up in Russian hands.
Indeed, it seems increasingly likely that Washington will block the transfer of the jets to Turkey, formalizing the temporary
measures in two recently passed appropriation bills to freeze funding for the transfer.
If the two sides fail to reach agreement on the S-400, the likely U.S. response risks undermining
a key element of the modern Turkish-American alliance:
defense industrial cooperation.
There are three related risks that could deepen strains in the bilateral alliance.
First, the transfer of the F-35 to Turkey may be blocked, which could then delay the delivery of aircraft
to European F-35 operators.
Second, the delivery of the S-400 to Turkey could prompt sanctions under the Countering America's Adversaries
Through Sanctions Act (CAATSA).
U.S. officials have repeatedly warned Ankarathat the imposition of sanctions will have negative consequences
for U.S.-Turkish defense cooperation.
Third, legacy and current U.S.-Turkish defense cooperation on a myriad of projects could be impacted should
Turkish aerospace firms be sanctioned.
The contentious negotiations over U.S.-Turkish defense industrial cooperation symbolize a broader and uncomfortable
Ankara and Washington no longer have overlapping interests or a common understanding of how to solve regional problems.
The two sides oppose one another in Syria and, since the Turkish-Russian rapprochement,
view the Russian threat differently.
Accordingly, they have adopted conflicting policy goals.
The S-400 is a microcosm of this reality:
The United States and those European allies who operate the F-35 think the Russian missile radar poses a threat, while Turkey disagrees.
The F-35's secrets, for Ankara, are not as important as the relationship it has forged with Russia,
and the cost of cancelling a questionable procurement decision outweighs the benefits of fixing
the spat with the United States.
This Turkish choice, in turn, is a clear signal that Ankara is not willing to prioritize
its relationship with Washington, a reality that will have repercussions far beyond defense procurement.
American Support for the Turkish Defense Industry:
Tensions and Tradeoffs
In the late 1970s and 1980s, the Turkish government began building up an indigenous defense industry.
The passage of Law No. 3238 in 1985 sought to build up Turkey's domestic arms industry through a policy of
offsets for military procurements.
In 1998, Turkey expanded on this law with the Turkish Cabinet's passage of Resolution #23378,
which is the basis for the now-common theme in the Erdogan administration's:
Equip the Turkish armed forces with domestically produced arms and ensure that Turkish firms are globally competitive in high-technology defense products.
For this reason, Ankara has long wanted to purchase a long-range air and missile defense system with
the intent of reaching separate agreements that would eventually allow Turkey's local industry to produce
its own missile systems to replace imported ones - a program that has already started.
Ankara's defense procurement strategy is not unique.
Many countries condition the purchase of U.S. military equipment on a contractual agreement that
the technology will be transferred to, co-produced by, or otherwise benefit local industry.
This strategy, however, often leads to tensions over U.S. export controls, which generally exist to
ensure adversaries do not gain access to sensitive American-origin technology.
The Turkish government has long criticized the United States for failing to meet Turkish firms'
demands related to technology transfer and work-share arrangements.
Washington and Ankara are broadly aligned on the need to ensure the readiness of the Turkish Armed
Forces and to ensure that the two militaries are interoperable.
However, as is the case with other allies, Ankara's desire to build a domestic defense industry could
help to strengthen Turkish armed forces - a U.S. foreign policy goal - but also result in Turkey showing
a preference for domestic suppliers, which complicates American private industry access to the Turkish market.
This fundamental tension - U.S. support for Turkish industrial development versus the desire to
continue to export American-made items - is not new.
In 1974, after Turkey intervened in Cyprus over the objections of the Nixon administration,
the U.S. Congress imposed an arms embargo to punish Turkey for its decision to use military force.
The embargo severely disrupted Turkish military planning and created a serious shortage in spare parts.
It also demonstrated Congress' power to dictate foreign policy to a wary executive branch -
a dynamic that resembles the S-400 debate.
In response, the Turkish government closed jointly operated U.S.-Turkish military bases, questioned the
legal validity of the presence of the 15,000 or so American military personnel in Turkey, and placed
all bases in the country under Turkish command.
In 1980, the United States and Turkey reached a deal on the Defense Economic Cooperation Agreement
to overcome the fallout.
The agreement was an effort to undo the dueling countermeasures, rebuild trust, increase defense cooperation,
and give U.S. support to Turkey's efforts to build domestic industry.
Ankara committed to lessening its dependence on the United States and starting the process of
developing a defense industrial base to equip and supply its own armed forces.
The Turkish decision to purchase the S-400 has baffled many in Washington.
Though the Turkish government has long-pursued long-range air and missile defense, it has always
prioritized the transfer of technology and work share arrangements to ensure robust local
Russia has not reached any substantive agreement with the Turkish government on any of these criteria.
Ankara has indicated that it intends to begin phasing out the F-16 - currently the backbone of the
Turkish Air Force - in 2023, and start the transition to the F-35.
If the deal falls apart, however, Turkey could be forced to rely on the F-16 for much longer than initially planned.
This has led to speculation that the purchase of the S-400 stems from a top-down political decision made between two men:
President Recep Tayyip Erdogan and President Vladimir Putin.
The S-400 agreement comes amid a severe downturn in U.S.-Turkish relations,
stemming from radically incongruent policy aims in Syria, sharp disagreements about the imprisonment of
Americans in Turkey, and the U.S. government's refusal to extradite Fethullah Gulen.
But in contrast to these previous crises, the potential punishment for the S-400 purchase - a severe curtailment
of U.S.-Turkish defense cooperation and the denial of the export of a fighter jet Turkey helped to finance -
will undermine the centerpiece of the post-1980 U.S.-Turkish alliance.
Washington is using a combination of carrots and sticks to try to avoid this.
The United States has threatened sanctions, but also offered to replace the S-400 with the
U.S.-made Patriot air and missile defense system.
Turkey has, thus far, refused to budge, saying it will go ahead with the purchase of the S-400.
As the clock ticks towards the delivery of the Russian missile system and subsequent triggering of CAATSA sanctions,
the negotiations appear to have ended in disagreement, raising the specter of Turkey's removal from the F-35 program.
National Security Decision-Making in Turkey Since 2016
Despite the risks and the Patriot counter-offer, Erdogan and senior officials have not signaled that any
change in policy is on the agenda.
Ankara's approach may stem from recent changes in domestic politics, the serious downturn in U.S.-Turkish relations,
and a longer-term change in how the Turkish national security elite makes decisions.
Events in Syria - specifically, serious disagreement over how to address the civil war and fight Islamic State,
as well as U.S. support for a Kurdish ground force that Turkey opposes - have made clear that Washington and Ankara have
vastly different interests in the Middle East.
Within Turkey itself, the consolidation of power in the presidency, the erosion of Turkish democratic
institutions, and the lasting effects of the failed July 2016 coup attempt have also changed decision-making on
The policymaking apparatus is now far narrower.
It is unclear how information is transmitted from lower levels of the bureaucracy up the chain to
Erdogan, how that information comports with Erdogan's self-defined interests, and how the resulting policy gets made.
One result of these shifts has been the Turkish government's efforts to bolster relations with Russia.
The Turkish-Russian entente spurred from a recalibration of Ankara's interests in Syria and a recognition
that Moscow's approval was needed to launch two cross-border operations designed to counter the Syrian Kurds.
Talks with Russia take place at the highest levels, with Erdogan often negotiating directly with Putin.
The arrangement favors both countries' political systems, whereby power is significantly concentrated in
the office of the presidency and the bureaucracy is less empowered to freestyle and go beyond talking points
to try and find common ground with the United States.
This dynamic has shaped the dueling negotiations with Russia for the S-400 and with the United States
for the Patriot system.
In the past, Washington could count on Turkish political elites to weigh American reactions to policy choices
as one key variable of the policymaking process.
This is no longer the case. Instead, Ankara has made clear that it will pursue its own interests,
independent of considerations of its traditional allies, and work with leaders who enable the
realization of narrowly-defined Turkish interests.
This new dynamic in Turkish decision-making has created space to pursue unorthodox procurement decisions
simply because Erdogan chooses to absorb expected allied condemnation and to gamble that the West
will eventually acquiesce because of the strategic importance many attach to Turkey's locations.